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Abstract. Rank Decoding is the main underlying problem in rank-
based cryptography. Based on this problem and quasi-cyclic versions of
it, very efficient schemes have been proposed recently, such as those in
the ROLLO and RQC submissions, which have reached the second round
of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process. Two
main approaches have been studied to solve the Rank Decoding prob-
lem: combinatorial ones and algebraic ones. While the former has been
studied extensively in [23] and [10], a better understanding of the latter
was recently obtained with [11] where it appeared that algebraic attacks
can often be more efficient than combinatorial ones for cryptographic pa-
rameters. In particular, the results of [11] were based on Gro¨bner basis
computations which led to complexity bounds slightly smaller than the
claimed security of ROLLO and RQC cryptosystems. This paper gives
substantial improvements upon this attack together with a much more
precise analysis of its complexity compared to the one in [11]. Against
ROLLO-I-128, ROLLO-I-192, and ROLLO-I-256, our attack has bit com-
plexity respectively in 70, 86, and 158, to be compared to 117, 144, and
197 for the attack in [11]. Moreover, unlike this previous attack, ours
does not need generic Gro¨bner basis algorithms since it only requires to
solve a linear system. This improvement relies upon a modeling slightly
different from the one in [11] combined with a new modeling for a generic
MinRank instance. The latter modeling allows us to solve the MinRank
problem using only linear algebra as well and no longer generic Gro¨bner
basis algorithms, in addition to this, this new algorithm enables us to
refine the analysis of MinRank’s complexity given in [34]. MinRank is
a problem of great interest for all multivariate-based cryptosystems, in-
cluding GeMSS and Rainbow, which are at the second round of the
aforementionned NIST competition; our new approach supersedes previ-
ous attacks for the MinRank problem.
Keywords: Post-quantum cryptography · NIST-PQC candidates · rank
metric code-based cryptography · algebraic attack.
1 Introduction
Rank metric code-based cryptography. In the last decade, rank metric
code-based cryptography has proved to be a powerful alternative to more tradi-
tional code-based cryptography based on the Hamming metric. This thread of
research started with the GPT cryptosystem [21] based on Gabidulin codes [20],
which are rank metric analogues of Reed-Solomon codes. However, the strong
algebraic structure of those codes was successfully exploited for attacking the
original GPT cryptosystem and its variants with the Overbeck attack [33] (see
for example [31] for one of the latest related developments). This has to be traced
back to the algebraic structure of Gabidulin codes that makes masking extremely
difficult; one can draw a parallel with the situation in the Hamming metric where
essentially all McEliece cryptosystems based on Reed-Solomon codes or variants
of them have been broken. However, recently a rank metric analogue of the
NTRU cryptosystem from [27] has been designed and studied, starting with the
pioneering paper [22]. Roughly speaking, the NTRU cryptosystem relies on a
lattice that has vectors of rather small Euclidean norm. It is precisely those
vectors that allow an efficient decoding/deciphering process. The decryption of
the cryptosystem proposed in [22] relies on LRPC codes that have rather short
vectors in the dual code, but this time for the rank metric. These vectors are
used for decoding in the rank metric. This cryptosystem can also be viewed as
the rank metric analogue of the MDPC cryptosystem [30] that relies on short
vectors in the dual code for the Hamming metric.
This new way of building rank metric code-based cryptosystems has led to
a sequence of proposals [22,24,5,6], culminating in submissions to the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) post-quantum competition [2,3],
whose security relies solely on the decoding problem in rank metric codes with a
ring structure similar to the ones encountered right now in lattice-based cryptog-
raphy. Interestingly enough, one can also build signature schemes using the rank
metric; even though early attempts which relied on masking the structure of a
code [25,9] have been broken [15], a promising recent approach [8] only considers
random matrices without structural masking.
Decoding Fqm-linear codes in Rank metric. In other words, in rank metric
code-based cryptography we are now only left with assessing the difficulty of
the decoding problem for the rank metric. The trend in rank metric code-based
cryptography has been to consider a particular form of codes that are linear codes
of length n over an extension Fqm of degreem of Fq, that is, Fqm-linear subspaces
of Fnqm . Let (β1, . . . , βm) be any basis of Fqm as a Fq-vector space. Then words
of those codes can be interpreted as matrices with entries in the ground field Fq
by viewing a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnqm as a matrix Mat(x) = (Xij)i,j in
Fm×nq , where (Xij)1≤i≤m is the column vector formed by the coordinates of xj
in the basis (β1, . . . , βm), that is, xj = β1X1j + · · ·+ βmXmj .
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Then the “rank” metric d on Fnqm is the rank metric on the associated matrix
space, namely
d(x,y) := |y − x| , where we define |x| := Rank (Mat(x)) .
Hereafter, we will use the following terminology.
Problem 1 ((m,n, k, r)-decoding problem).
Input : an Fqm -basis (c1, . . . , ck) of a subspace C of Fnqm , an integer r ∈ N,
and a vector y ∈ Fnqm at distance at most r of C (i.e. |y − c| ≤ r for some c ∈ C).
Output : c ∈ C and e ∈ Fnqm such that y = c+ e and |e| ≤ r.
This problem is known as the Rank Decoding problem, written RD. It is equiva-
lent to the Rank Syndrome Decoding problem, written RSD, for which one uses
the parity check matrix of the code instead of the generator matrix. There are
two approaches to solve RD instances: the combinatorial ones such as those in
[23] and [10] and the algebraic ones, such as in [11]; the latter are one of the
purposes of this article.
Even if the decoding problem is not known to be NP-complete for these Fqm-
linear codes, there is a randomised reduction to an NP-complete problem [26]
(namely to decoding in the Hamming metric). The region of parameters which
is of interest for the NIST submissions corresponds to m = Θ (n), k = Θ (n) and
r = Θ (
√
n).
The MinRank problem. The MinRank problem was first mentioned in [13]
where its NP-completeness was also proven. MinRank plays a role in multivariate-
based cryptography which is similar to the one of Rank Decoding for rank met-
ric code-based cryptography. Moreover, the Rank Decoding problem reduces to
MinRank as explained in [18].
Problem 2 (MinRank problem).
Input : an integer r ∈ N and K + 1 matrices Y ,M1, . . . ,MK ∈ Fm×nq .
Output : field elements x1, x2, . . . , xK ∈ Fq such that
Rank
(
Y −
K∑
i=1
xiM i
)
≤ r.
The current best known algorithms for solving the MinRank problem have ex-
ponential complexity bounds.
Algebraic attacks. This family of attacks consists in modeling the decoding
problem into a system of multivariate polynomial equations and then solve this
system. In [11], the constructed system was solved by using Gro¨bner basis tech-
niques. Similar approaches exist for solving the MinRank problem, such as the
Kipnis-Shamir modeling [28] and the minors modeling (described for example
in [19]); the complexity of solving MinRank using these modelings has been
investigated in [18,19].
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Our contribution. In this paper, we follow on from the approach in [11] and
propose a slightly different modeling to solve the RD problem. This system can
be solved “directly” by linearization, avoiding the use of Gro¨bner basis algo-
rithms such as Fauge`re’s F4 algorithm, see [17]. This new modeling brings on
a substantial speed-up in the computations for solving the system. It results in
the best practical efficiency and complexity bounds that are currently known for
the decoding problem; in particular, it significantly improves upon the aforemen-
tionned similar approach in [11]. We provide dedicated algorithms for solving the
systems, with less computations than a generic Gro¨bner basis algorithm, hence
resulting in a better complexity. We present attacks for ROLLO-I-128, ROLLO-
I-192, and ROLLO-I-256 with bit complexity respectively in 70, 86, and 158,
to be compared to 117, 144, and 197 for the attack in [11]. The difference with
[11] is significant since as there is no real quantum speed-up for solving linear
systems, the best quantum attacks for ROLLO-I-192 remained the quantum at-
tack based on combinatorial attacks, when our new attacks show that ROLLO
parameters are broken and need to be changed.
Our analysis is divided into two categories: the “overdetermined” and the
“underdetermined” case. An (m,n, k, r)-decoding instance is overdetermined if
the condition
m
(
n− k − 1
r
)
≥
(
n
r
)
− 1 (1)
is fulfilled. In that case we obtain a complexity in
O
(
m
(
n− p− k − 1
r
)(
n− p
r
)ω−1)
(2)
operations in the field Fq, where ω is the constant of linear algebra and p =
max{i : i ∈ {1..n},m(n−i−k−1
r
) ≥ (n−i
r
) − 1} represents, in case the overdeter-
mined condition (1) is comfortably fulfilled, the use of punctured codes. This
complexity clearly supersedes the previous results of [11] in terms of complexity
and also by the fact that it does not require generic Gro¨bner Basis algorithms.
In a rough way for r = O (√n) (the type of parameters used for ROLLO and
RQC), the recent improvements on algebraic attacks can be seen as this: before
[11] the complexity for solving RD involved a term in O(n2) in the upper part
of a binomial coefficient, the modeling in [11] replaced it by a term in O
(
n
3
2
)
whereas our new modeling involves a term in O(n) at a similar position. This
leads to a gain in the exponential coefficient of order 30 % compared to [11] and
of order 50 % compared to approaches before [11]. Notice that for ROLLO and
RQC only parameters with announced complexities 128 and 192 bits satisfied
condition (1) but not parameters with announced complexities 256 bits.
When condition (1) is not fulfilled, the instance can either be underdeter-
mined or be brought back to the overdetermined area by an hybrid approach
using exhaustive search with exponential complexity to guess few variables in the
system. In the underdetermined case, our approach is different from [11]. Here
we propose an approach using reduction to the MinRank problem. This leads to
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a new modeling to solve generic MinRank instances, also avoiding Gro¨bner basis
computation and thus giving a more precise analysis of the MinRank problem
than in [34]. In particular our new approach gives a better complexity for solving
the MinRank problem with algebraic attacks.
Note that for some parameters proposed in [7,1] (in the versions prior to the
updates of April 2020), the condition (1) holds. Taking for ω the smallest value
currently achievable in practice, which is ω ≈ 2.8 via Strassen’s algorithm, this
leads to an attack on the schemes proposed in these NIST submissions which is
in all cases below the claimed classical security level and sometimes way below
the previous attack in [11].
At last, we propose an analysis explaining precisely why our attack is signif-
icantly more efficient without the use of generic Gro¨bner basis algorithms.
2 Notation
In the whole paper, we will focus on the case which is relevant for cryptographic
applications, namely when the base field Fq has characteristic 2. Analogous re-
sults can be obtained for other field characteristics but involve putting the rel-
evant signs wherever this is needed. We also use the following notation and
definitions:
– Matrices and vectors are written in boldface font M .
– The entry in row i and column j of a matrix M is denoted by M [i, j].
– The transpose of a matrix M is denoted by MT.
– For a given ring R, the set of matrices with n rows, m columns and coeffi-
cients in R is denoted by Rn×m.
– {1..n} stands for the set of integers from 1 to n.
– For two subsets I ⊂ {1..n} and J ⊂ {1..m}, we writeM I,J for the submatrix
of M formed by its rows (resp. columns) with index in I (resp. J).
– We use the shorthand notation M∗,J = M{1..m},J and M I,∗ = M I,{1..n},
where M has m rows and n columns.
– α ∈ Fqm is a primitive element, so that (1, α, . . . , αm−1) is a basis of Fqm as
an Fq-vector space.
– For v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Fnqm . The support of v is the Fq-vector subspace
of Fqm spanned by the vectors v1, . . . , vn. Thus this support is the column
space of the matrix Mat(v) associated to v (for any choice of basis), and its
dimension is precisely Rank(Mat(v)).
– An [n, k] Fqm-linear code is an Fqm-linear subspace of F
n
qm of dimension k
endowed with the rank metric.
3 Algebraic modeling of the decoding problem
In what follows, we consider the (m,n, k, r)-decoding problem for the code C
and assume we have received y ∈ Fnqm at distance r from C and look for the
unique vectors c ∈ C and e such that y = c + e and |e| = r. The reasons why
we consider that there is one single solution e of rank exactly r are the same as
described in [11].
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3.1 Ourivksi-Johansson modeling
We start from the Ourivski-Johansson’s system ([32]), where
Hy =
(−RT In−k−1)
is a parity-check matrix of the code C˜ = C+ 〈y〉, (1 α . . . αm−1) is a basis of Fqm
over Fq, and the error e is written e =
(
1 α . . . αm−1
)
SC where S represents a
basis of the support of e in
(
Fmq
)r
and C the coordinates of e in this basis. We
call the entries of S the support variables whereas the entries of C are called the
coefficient variables.
Then e is a solution of the system(
1 α . . . αm−1
)
SCHTy = 0n−k−1. (3)
This system has a large number of solutions, that corresponds to the λe, with
any non-zero λ ∈ Fqm and to different bases of the support of e. If we specialize
one support and one λ, the system has exactly one solution in Fq, provided that
the error can be uniquely decoded and has weight exactly r.
It is shown in [11] that, when S is specialized with its first column to 1 and
S{1..r},∗ = Ir and C has its first column equal to 1, then the solution of the
system is also a solution of the system
MaxMinors(CHTy ) = 0r×(n−k−1)
that consists in all maximal minors of degree r of the matrix CHTy , that is(
n−k−1
r
)
polynomials that can be expressed linearly in terms of cT = det(C∗,T )
where T ⊂ {1..n} is a subset of size r. In the over-determined case, that is if
m
(
n−k−1
r
) ≥ (n
r
)− 1, then the system can be linearized and the values of all cT
recovered.
In the next section, we show that with a slightly different specialization, in
the over-determined case, we can recover directly the values of all the variables
in C only with linear algebra.
3.2 The system MaxMinors with the identity specialized in C
For the sake of presentation, we assume here that the first r coordinates of e are
independent over Fq. In [11] there is an algorithm to handle the general case by
making several attempts, it can easily be adapted to find r components of e of
rank r.
Under this assumption, we can specialize System (3) with the identity in the
first columns of C, and the value 1T =
(
1 0 . . . 0
)T
in the first column of S.
Precisely, we define
FC =
{(
1 α · · · αm−1) (1T S′) (Ir C ′)HTy} , (4)
where 1T ∈ Fmq is a column vector, S =
(
1T S′
)
and C =
(
Ir C
′
)
.
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We will now show that the new system
FM = MaxMinors
((
Ir C
′
)
HTy
)
, (5)
which is the set of all minors of size r of the matrix
(
Ir C
′
)
HTy , can be used to
recover the values of the variables in C.
Let VFq (FC) be the set of solutions of (4) with all variables in Fq, that is
VFq (FC) ={
(S∗,C∗) ∈ Fqm(r−1)+r(n−r) :
(
1 α · · · αm−1) (1T S∗) (Ir C∗)HTy = 0} . (6)
Let VFq (FM ) be the set of solutions of (5) with all variables in Fq, i.e.
VFq (FM ) =
{
C∗ ∈ Fqr(n−r) : RankFqm
((
Ir C
∗
)
HTy
)
< r
}
.
Proposition 1. If e can be uniquely decoded and has rank r, then
VFq (FM ) =
{
C∗ ∈ Fr(n−r)q : ∃S∗ ∈ Fm(r−1)q s.t. (S∗,C∗) ∈ VFq (FC)
}
. (7)
This means that the set VFq (FM ) is the projection of the set VFq (FC) on the last
r(n− r) coordinates.
Proof. Let (S∗,C∗) ∈ VFq (FC), then the non-zero vector(
1 S∗2 . . . S
∗
r
)
=
(
1 α · · · αm−1) (1T S∗)
belongs to the left kernel of the matrix
(
Ir C
∗
)
HTy . Hence this matrix has rank
less than r, and C∗ ∈ VFq (FM ). Reciprocally, if C∗ ∈ VFq (FM ), then the matrix(
Ir C
∗
)
HTy has rank less than r, hence its left kernel over Fqm contains a non
zero element (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
r ) = (1, α, . . . , α
m−1)S∗ with the coefficients of S∗ in Fq.
But S∗1 cannot be zero, as it would mean that (0, S
∗
2 , . . . , S
∗
r )
(
Ir C
∗
)
is an error
of weight less than r solution of the decoding problem, and we assumed there
are only one error of weight exactly r solution of the decoding problem. Then,
(S∗1
−1(S∗2 , . . . , S
∗
r ),C
∗) ∈ VFq (FC). ⊓⊔
This means that solving the decoding problem is left to solve the MaxMinors
system, that depends only on the C variables.
Proposition 2. The system MaxMinors(CHTy ) contains
(
n−k−1
r
)
polynomials
of degree r over Fqm , indexed by the subsets J ⊂ {1..n − k − 1} of size r, that
are the
PJ =
∑
T1⊂{1..k+1},T2⊂J,
#T1+#T2=r
T=T1∪(T2+k+1)
(−1)σJ (T2) det(RT1,J\T2) det(C∗,T ), (8)
where the sum is over all subsets T 1 ⊂ {1..k + 1} and T 2 subset of J , with
#T 1 +#T 2 = r, and σJ (T2) is an integer depending on T2 and J . We denote
by T2 + k + 1 the set {i+ k + 1 : i ∈ T2}.
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Remark 1. There are
(
n
r
)
different polynomials det(C∗,T ) involved in the
(
n−k−1
r
)
equations, and each equation PJ contains
(
k+r+1
r
)
such polynomials.
We have ci,j = det(C∗,{1..r}\{i}∪{j}) for any i ∈ {1..r} and j ∈ {r + 1..n},
and 1 = det(C∗,{1..r}).
For the proof, reader may refer to [11].
4 Solving Rank Decoding problem: overdetermined case
In this section, we show that, when the number of equations is sufficiently large,
we can solve the system MaxMinors with only linear algebra computations, by
linearisation on the polynomials det(C∗,T ).
4.1 The overdetermined case
The system MaxMinors can be viewed as a linear system with m
(
n−k−1
r
)
linear
equations over Fq, in the
(
n
r
) − 1 variables cT representing the non constant
polynomials det(C∗,T ), for all T ⊂ {1..n}, #T = r, T 6= {1..r}. According
to Remark 1, if we are able to linearise this sytem with respect to the variables
cT , then in particular we get the values of all the entries ci,j of the matrix C.
In order to linearise this system, we can expand each equation over Fqm
as m equations over Fq, and construct a matrix MaxMin with rows indexed
by (J, i) : J ⊂ {1..n − k − 1},#J = r, 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and columns indexed
by T ⊂ {1..n} of size r, with the entry in row (J, i) and column T being the
coefficient in αi of the element ± det(RT1,J\T2) ∈ Fqm . More precisely, we have
MaxMin[(J, i),T ] =
{
0 if T2 6⊂ J
[αi](−1)σJ (T2)(det(RT1,J\T2)) if T2 ⊂ J,
(9)
with T1 = T ∩ {1..k + 1},
and T2 = (T ∩ {k + 2..n})− (k + 1).
The matrix MaxMin can at most have rank
(
n
r
)− 1, as a maximal rank of (n
r
)
would imply that 〈MaxMinors(CHTy )〉 = 〈1〉.
Proposition 3. If MaxMin has rank
(
n
r
)− 1 (which implies that m(n−k−1
r
) ≥(
n
r
) − 1), then the right kernel of MaxMin contains only one element (c 1) ∈
F
(nr)
q with value 1 on its component corresponding to det(C{1..r}). The compo-
nents c of this vector contain the values of the det(C∗,T ), T 6= {1..r}. This gives
in particular the values of all the variables ci,j = det(C∗,{1..r}\{i}∪{j}).
Proof. If MaxMin has rank
(
n
r
)− 1, then as there is a solution to the system,
a row echelon form of the matrix has the shape(
I(nr)−1
cT
0 0
)
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with c a vector in Fq of size
(
n
r
) − 1: we cannot get a jump in the stair of the
echelon form as it would imply that Eq. (5) has no solution. Then
(−c 1) is in
the right kernel of MaxMin. ⊓⊔
It is then easy to recover the variables S from (4) by linear algebra. The following
algorithm recovers the error if there is one solution to the system (4). It is shown
in [11] how to deal with the other cases.
Input: Code C, vector y at distance r from C, such that m
(
n−k−1
r
)
≥
(
n
r
)
− 1
and MaxMin has maximal rank
Output: The error e of weight r such that y − e ∈ C
Construct MaxMin, the m
(
n−k−1
r
)
×
(
n
r
)
matrix over Fq associated to the
system MaxMinors Eq. (5) ;
Let
(
c 1
)
be the only such vector in the right kernel of MaxMinors ;
Compute the values C∗ = (c∗i,j)i,j from c;
Compute the values (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
r ) ∈ F
r
qm by solving the linear system
(S1, . . . , Sr)C
∗
H
T
y = 0
and taking the unique value with S∗1 = 1;
return (1, S∗2 , . . . , S
∗
r )C
∗ ;
Algorithm 1: (m,n, k, r)-Decoding in the overdetermined case.
Proposition 4. When m
(
n−k−1
r
) ≥ (n
r
) − 1 and MaxMin has maximal rank(
n
r
)− 1, then Algorithm 1 recovers the error in complexity
O
(
m
(
n− k − 1
r
)(
n
r
)ω−1)
(10)
operations in the field Fq, where ω is the constant of linear algebra.
Proof. To recover the error, the most consuming part is the computation of
the left kernel of the matrix MaxMin in F
m(n−k−1r )×(
n
r)
q , in the case where
m
(
n−k−1
r
) ≥ (n
r
) − 1. This can be done by computing an echelon form of
MaxMin, in this case the complexity is bounded by Eq. (10). ⊓⊔
We ran a lot of experiments, with the code C a random code, andm(n−k−1
r
) ≥(
n
r
)− 1, and we always got a matrix MaxMin with maximal rank. That is why
we propose the following heuristic about the rank of MaxMin.
Heuristic 1 (Overdetermined case) When m
(
n−k−1
r
) ≥ (n
r
)− 1, with over-
whelming probability, the rank of the matrix MaxMin is
(
n
r
)− 1.
Figure 1 gives the experimental results we obtained for q = 2, r = 3, 4, 5 and
different values of n. We choose to keep m prime and close to n/1.18 to have a
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data set containing the parameters of the ROLLO-I cryptosystem. We choose for
k the minimum between n2 and the largest value leading to an overdetermined
case. We have k = n2 as soon as n ≥ 22 for r = 3, n ≥ 36 for r = 4, n ≥
58 for r = 5. Experimentally, it does not seem to influence the complexity.
The figure shows that the estimated complexity is a good upper bound for the
computation’s complexity. It also shows that this upper bound is not tight.
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ROLLO-I
k = n
2
, r = 4
k = n
2
, r = 5
n
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g
2
(C
)
Complexity for r = 3, r = 4, r = 5 in the overdetermined cases
Theoretical r = 3
Theoretical r = 4
Theoretical r = 5
Experimental r = 5
Experimental r = 4
Experimental r = 3
Fig. 1. Theoretical vs Experimental value of the complexity of the computation. The
computations are done using magma v2.22-2 on a machine with a IntelR© XeonR©
2.00GHz processor. We measure the complexity in terms of clock cycles of the CPU,
given by the magma function ClockCycles(). The theoretical value is the binary loga-
rithm of m
(
n−k−1
r
)(
n
r
)2.81−1
. m is the largest prime less than n/1.18, and k the min-
imum of n/2 (right part of the graph) and the largest value for which the system is
overdetermined (left part).
Figure 2 shows the theoretical complexity, in the case where n = 2k and m is
prime and close to n/1.18. We take those parameters because they fit with the
parameters in the cryptosystem ROLLO-I. When the parameters (m,n, k, r) do
not satisfy the overdeterminess condition m
(
n−k−1
r
) ≥ (n
r
) − 1, we do not put
the complexity. The graph starts from the first value of n where (n/1.18, n, 2k, r)
is in the overdetermined case. We can see that theoretically, the cryptosystem
ROLLO-I-128 with parameters (79, 94, 47, 5) needs 273 bit operations to decode
an error, instead of the announced 2128 bits of security. In the same way, ROLLO-
I-192 with parameters (89, 106, 53, 6) would have 86 bits of security instead of
192. The parameters (113, 134, 67, 7) for ROLLO-I-256 are not in the overdeter-
mined case.
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Theoretical complexity for r = 5, 6, 7 in the overdetermined cases when n = 2k.
Fig. 2. Theoretical value of the complexity of the computation in the overdetermined
cases, which is the binary logarithm of m
(
n−k−1
r
)(
n
r
)
2.81−1
. m is the largest prime less
than n/1.18, n = 2k. The axis “R1, R2, R3” correspond to the values of n for the
cryptosystems ROLLO-I-128; ROLLO-I-192 and ROLLO-I-256.
4.2 Improvements in the overdetermined case
There are two classical improvements that can be used in the overdetermined
case. The first one is when the system is “super”-overdetermined, i.e. when the
number of rows in MaxMin is really larger than the number of columns. In that
case, it is not necessary to consider all equations, we just need the minimum
number of them to be able to find the solution.
To select the good equations, we can take the system MaxMinors obtained
by considering code Cy punctured on the p last coordinates, instead of the entire
code. Puncturing code Cy is equivalent to shortening the dual code, i.e. consid-
ering the system
MaxMinors
(
C∗,{1..n−p}(H
T
y ){1..n−p},{1..n−k−1−p}
)
. (11)
as we takeHy is systematic form on the last coordinates. This system is formed
by a sub-sequence of polynomials in MaxMinors that do not contains the vari-
ables ci,j with n−p+1 ≤ j ≤ n. This system contains m
(
n−p−k−1
r
)
equations in(
n−p
r
)
variables C∗,T with T ⊂ {1..n− p− k− 1}. If we take the maximal value
of p such that m
(
n−p−k−1
r
) ≥ (n−p
r
)− 1, we can still apply Algorithm 1 but the
11
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Fig. 3. Theoretical value of the complexity of RD in the overdetermined case (using
punctured codes or specialisation). C is the smallest value between (13) and (12). m is
the largest prime less than n/1.18, n = 2k. The dashed axes correspond to the values
of n for the cryptosystems ROLLO-I-128; ROLLO-I-192 and ROLLO-I-256.
complexity is reduced for instance to
O
(
m
(
n− p− k − 1
r
)(
n− p
r
)ω−1)
(12)
operations in the field Fq if we use Gaussian elimination.
4.3 Reducing to the overdetermined case: hybrid attack
Another classical improvement consists in using an hybrid approach mixing ex-
haustive search and linear resolution, like in [12]. This consists in specialising
some variables of the system to reduce to the overdetermined case.
For instance, if we specialise a columns of the matrix C, we are left with
solving qar linear systems MaxMin of size m
(
n−k−1
r
) × (n−a
r
)
, and the global
cost is
O
(
qarm
(
n− k − 1
r
)(
n− a
r
)ω−1)
(13)
operations in the field Fq if we use Gaussian elimination. Figure 3 page 12 gives
the best theoretical complexities obtained for r = 5 . . . 9 with the best values of
a and p, for n = 2k. Table 1 page 20 gives the complexities of our attack (column
“This paper”) for all the parameters in the ROLLO and RQC submissions to
the NIST competition; for the sake of clarity, we give the previous complexity
from [11].
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5 Solving Rank Decoding and MinRank problems:
underdetermined case
This section generalizes the method of solving RD in the overdetermined case
with just linear algebra to the underdetermined case and generic MinRank. This
analysis may be applied to explain the behavior of Gro¨bner basis algorithms for
solving these problems, and to provide an algorithm with a better complexity
than Gro¨bner basis algorithms for these problems.
5.1 Rank Decomposition Modeling
In this section we describe a modeling of the MinRank problem which is es-
pecially illustrative of the connections between RD and more generic instances
of MinRank. We will not use this modeling directly but will use it to establish
the variables and terminology for a more advanced form of modeling in subse-
quent sections. This more advanced modeling which we call “Support Minors
modeling” provides an improvement over previously known algebraic approach
to solving generic MinRank problems and can be conveniently combined with
the system MaxMinors to produce an improvement over previously known tech-
niques for solving RD in the underdetermined case.
Recall that rank decoding problem may be treated as a special case of the
MinRank Problem. We can reinterpret the RD problem as finding a non-trivial
low-rank linear combination over Fq of K˜ = m(k + 1) matrices in F
m×n
q , given
by (
M1 . . . MK˜
)
=
(
1 α . . . αm−1
)⊗ (G˜1 . . . G˜k+1) ,
where G˜1, . . . , G˜k+1 are the rows of a generator matrix for C˜, and elements of
Fnqm are represented as matrices over F
m×n
q . The possible linear combinations can
be written as
∑K˜
i=1 xiMi in terms of variables xi over Fq. As with Ourivski and
Johansson modeling (3), any low rank matrix M =
∑K˜
i=1 xiMi can be factored
into m × r and r × n matrices S and C. This results in a modeling of the
underlying MinRank problem we will dub Rank Decomposition modeling:
SC =
K˜∑
i=1
xiMi.
Note that in the above equation, the variables xi only occur linearly. As
such, we will dub them the “linear variables”. Provided that K˜ ≤ mn, we may
eliminate these linear variables from mn− K˜ of the above equations. The reader
may verify that the resulting system is equivalent to the Ourivski and Johansson
modeling (3) equations. However, in subsequent sections we will retain the linear
variables, as their use will be required to set up a better method of modeling for
both generic MinRank and the underdetermined case of RD.
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Wewill however eliminate enough of the linear variables to get a 1-dimensional
solution space for RD. Recall that the specialization used for S and C in the
Ourivski and Johansson modeling (3) case set m−1 entries in the first column of
SC to 0. Plugging this specialization into the Decomposition Modeling equation
we find that this has the effect of producing m−1 linear equations involving only
the xi’s. In subsequent analysis, we will therefore eliminate these m − 1 linear
variables, resulting in a Decomposition Modeling system with a 1-dimensional
solution space involving only K = mk + 1 linear variables.
5.2 Support Minors Modeling for Generic MinRank
Consider a generic MinRank problem involving K matrices of dimension m× n
with a target rank of r, where the Rank Decomposition Modeling equations are
given by:
SC =
K∑
i=1
xiMi.
Consider the m matrices of dimension (r+1)×n given by C stacked with a
row, rj = pij
∑K
i=1 xiMi, of
∑K
i=1 xiMi , where pij is the row vector with only
one 1 on the jst column :
C′j =
(
rj
C
)
.
For any S,C, xi solving the Rank Decomposition Modeling form of the MinRank
problem, we have that rj is in the span of the rows of C and therefore each
matrix C ′j has rank at most r. This allows us to set up a new modeling for the
MinRank problem by setting the (r+1)×(r+1) minors of the matrices C ′j equal
to zero. The resulting equations, of which there are m
(
n
r+1
)
can be expressed via
Cofactor expansion with respect to their first row. In this way they can be seen to
be expressible as bilinear forms in the variables xi and the r×r minors of C, i.e.
the variables cT . As there are K
(
n
r
)
monomials that are bilinear in the variables
xi and the variables cT , and the solution space has dimension 1, we expect to
be able to solve the Support Minors Modeling system by direct linearization
whenever:
m
(
n
r + 1
)
≥ K
(
n
r
)
− 1. (14)
We did a lot of experiments as explained in Section 5.5, and they suggest that
it is the case.
Remark 2. Note that, in what follows, the Eq. (14) will sometimes be refered as
the “b = 1 case”.
5.3 Solving Support Minors Modeling at a higher degree
In the case where Eq. (14) does not hold we may produce a generalized version of
Support Minors Modeling, multiplying the Support Minors Modeling equations
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by homogeneous degree b − 1 monomials in the linear variables, resulting in
a system of equations that are homogeneous degree 1 in the variables cT and
homogeneous degree b in the variables xi. The strategy will again be to linearize
over monomials. The most common cases are q = 2 and q > b. In the former case
there are
∑b
i=1
(
n
r
)(
K
i
)
monomials, and in the latter case there are
(
n
r
)(
K+b−1
b
)
.
For the time being, we will focus on the simpler q > b case. There is however
an unavoidable complication which occurs whenever we consider b ≥ q. Unlike
in the simpler b = 1 case, for b ≥ 2 we cannot assume that all m( n
r+1
)(
K+b−2
b−1
)
equations we produce in this way are linearly independent up to the point where
we can solve the system by linearization. In fact, we can construct explicit linear
relations between the equations starting at b = 2.
To construct a nontrivial linear relation at b = 2, let Tjk be the coefficients
of a symmetric 2-tensor of dimension m. It then follows that the (r+2)× (r+2)
minors of the following matrix expression are equal to zero:
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=1
Tjk
rjrk
C

To see this, note that the minors of the matrix
rjrk
C
 are antisymmetric
with respect to j and k, while the tensor Tjk used to contract the j and k
indices is symmetric. The minors correspond to linear relations among the b = 2
equations, since they can be expanded via cofactor expansion as a sum of terms
that are products of a linear polynomial in the xi variables and a b = 1 equation
corresponding to a minor of C ′k =
(
rk
C
)
, and are therefore in the span of the
b = 2 equations.
These linear relations may be mapped into relations among the b = 3 equa-
tions by multiplying each b = 2 equation in the cofactor expansion of the b = 2
linear relation by the same linear monomial in the xi variables. However, the
resulting linear relations, are not themselves linearly independent, due to the
fact that for any 3-tensor with coefficients Tjkl, the r + 3 by r + 3 minors of
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=1
m∑
l=1
Tjkl

rj
rk
rl
C

are equal to zero and are in the span of the b = 3 linear relations derived
from the b = 2 linear relations. This argument extends also to higher values of
b, so that, if linear relations of the form considered above are the only relevant
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linear relations, then the number of linearly independent equations available for
linearization at a given value of b is:
Exp =
b∑
i=1
(−1)i+1
(
n
r + i
)(
m+ i− 1
i
)(
K + b− i− 1
b − i
)
. (15)
Experimentally, we found this to be the case with the only exceptions being:
1. When Exp exceeds the number of monomials for a smaller value of b, typ-
ically 1, the number of equations is observed to be equal to the number of
monomials for all higher values of b as well, even if Exp does not exceed the
total number of monomials at these higher values of b.
2. When the underlying MinRank Problem has a nontrivial solution and can-
not be solved a b = 1, we find the maximum number of linearly independent
equations is not the total number of monomials but is less by 1. This is
expected, since when the underlying MinRank problem has a nontrivial so-
lution, then the Support Minors Modeling equations have a 1 dimensional
solution space.
We can also construct additional nontrivial linear relations starting at b =
r + 2. The simplest example of this sort of linear relation occurs when m >
r + 1. Note that each of the Support Minors modeling equations at b = 1 is
bilinear in the xi variables and a subset consisting of r + 1 of the variables cT .
Note also, that there are a total of m equations derived from the same subset
(One for each row of
∑K
i=0 xiMi .) Therefore, if we consider the Jacobian of
the b = 1 equations with respect to the variables cT , the m equations involving
only r + 1 of the variables cT will form a submatrix with m rows and only
r + 1 nonzero columns. We can therefore construct a left kernel vector for these
equations whose coefficients are degree r + 1 polynomials in the xi variables.
Multiplying the equations by this kernel vector will produce zero, because the
b = 1 equations are homogeneous, and multiplying equations from a bilinear
system by a kernel vector of the Jacobian of that system cancels all the highest
degree terms. This suggests that Eq. (15) needs to be modified when we consider
values of b that are r + 2 or greater. These additional linear relations do not
appear to be relevant in the most interesting range of b for attacks on any of the
cryptosystems considered, however.
In summary, in the general case, we expect to be able to linearize at degree
b whenever b < r + 2 and
(
n
r
)(
K + b− 1
b
)
−1 ≤
b∑
i=1
(−1)i+1
(
n
r + i
)(
m+ i− 1
i
)(
K + b− i− 1
b− i
)
(16)
Note that, for b = 1, we recovert the result (14).
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5.4 The q = 2 case
The same considerations apply in the q = 2 case, but due to the field equations,
x2i = xi, for systems with b ≥ 2, a number of monomials will collapse to a lower
degree. This results in a system which is no longer homogeneous. Thus, in this
case it is most profitable to combine the equations obtained at a given value of
b with those produced using all smaller values of b. Similar considerations to the
general case imply that as long as b < r + 2 we will have
Exp =
b∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(−1)i+1
(
n
r + i
)(
m+ i− 1
i
)(
K
j − i
)
. (17)
equations with which to linearize the
b∑
j=1
(
n
r
)(
K
j
)
monomials that occur at a given value of b. We therefore expect to be able
to solve by linearization when b < r + 2 and b is large enough that
b∑
j=1
(
n
r
)(
K
j
)
− 1 ≤
b∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(−1)i+1
(
n
r + i
)(
m+ i− 1
i
)(
K
j − i
)
. (18)
5.5 Improvements for Generic Minrank
We can consider applying the Support Minors Modeling techniques to subma-
trices
∑K
i=1M
′
ixi of
∑K
i=1Mixi. We generally find that the most beneficial set-
tings use matrices with all m rows, but only n′ ≤ n of the columns. Note that
if
∑K
i=1Mixi has rank less than or equal to r, so does
∑K
i=1M
′
ixi , so assuming
we have a unique solution xi to both systems of equations, it will be the same. It
is always beneficial for the attacker to reduce n′ to the minimum value allowing
linearization at a given degree b, however, it can sometimes lead to an even lower
complexity to reduce n′ further and solve at a higher degree b.
We verified experimentally that the value of Exp correctly predicts the num-
ber of linearly independent polynomials. We constructed random systems (with
and without a solution) for q = 2, 13, withm = 7, 8, r = 2, 3, n = r+3, r+4, r+5,
K = 3, . . . , 20. In all the cases, the number of linearly independent polynomials
was as expected.
5.6 Using Support Minors Modeling in conjunction with MaxMin
for RD
Recall that from MaxMin, we obtain m
(
n−k−1
r
)
homogeneous linear equations
in the variables cT . These can be used to produce equations over the same
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monomials as used for Support Minors Modeling with K = mk + 1. In the
q > b case, this can be done by multiplying the equations from MaxMin by
homogeneous degree b monomials in the variables xi. In the q = 2 case this can
be done by multiplying the MaxMin equations by monomials of degree b or less.
With all the arguments mentionned above and the experiments mentionned in
Section 5.5, we can make a similar heuristic as Heuristic 1, this suggests that
linearization is possible for q > b, 0 < b < r + 2 whenever:(
n
r
)(
mk + b
b
)
− 1 ≤
m
(
n− k − 1
r
)(
mk + b
b
)
+
b∑
i=1
(−1)i+1
(
n
r + i
)(
m+ i− 1
i
)(
mk + b− i
b− i
)
,
(19)
and for q = 2, 0 < b < r + 2 whenever:
Ab − 1 ≤ Bc + Cb (20)
where
Ab :=
b∑
j=1
(
n
r
)(
mk + 1
j
)
Bb :=
b∑
j=1
(
m
(
n− k − 1
r
)(
mk + 1
j
))
Cb :=
b∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(
(−1)i+1
(
n
r + i
)(
m+ i− 1
i
)(
mk + 1
j − i
))
.
For the latter, it leads to a complexity of
O ((Bb + Cb)Aω−1b ) (21)
where b is the smallest positive integer so that the condition (20) is fulfilled. This
complexity formula correspond to solving a linear system with Ab unknowns and
Bb + Cb equations, recall that ω is the constant of linear algebra.
One notices that for a large range of parameters, this system is particularly
sparse, so one could take advantage of that to use Wiedemann algorithm [35].
More precisely, for values of m, n, r and k of ROLLO or RQC parameters (see
Table 4 and Table 5) for which the condition (20) is fulfilled, we typically find
that b ≈ r.
In this case, Bb equations consist of
(
k+r+1
r
)
monomials, Cb equations consist
of (mk + 1)(r + 1) monomials, and the total space of monomials is of size Ab.
The Wiedemann’s algorithm complexity can be written in term of the average
number of monomials per equation, in our case it is
Bb
(
k+r+1
r
)
+ Cb(mk + 1)(r + 1)
Bb + Cb
.
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Thus the linearized system at degree b is sufficiently sparse that Wiedemann
outperforms Strassen for b ≥ 2. Therefore the complexity of support minors
modeling bootstrapping MaxMin for RD is
O
Bb(k+r+1r )+ Cb(mk + 1)(r + 1)
Bb + Cb
 b∑
j=1
(
n
r
)(
mk + 1
j
)2
 (22)
where b is still the smallest positive integer so that the condition (20) is fulfilled.
A similar formula applies for the case q > b and for parameters of other
cryptosystems such as Rainbow and GeMMS.
6 Complexity of the attacks for different cryptosystems
and comparison with generic Gro¨bner basis approaches
6.1 Attacks against the Rank Decoding problem
Table 1 presents the complexity of our attack (see sections 4 and 5) against
RD and gives the complexities (column “This paper”) for all the parameters in
the ROLLO and RQC submissions to the NIST competition and Loidreau cryp-
tosystem [29]; for the sake of clarity, we give the previous best known complexity
from [11] (last column).
Recall that when a = 0 it corresponds to the overdetermined case, when
p 6= 0 it corresponds to the “super”-overdetermined case, see Section 4.2, when
a 6= 0 it corresponds to the hybrid case, see Section 4.3. The third column gives
the orignal rate of “overdeterminess” and the fifth column gives the final rate
after modification.
6.2 Attacks against the MinRank problem
Tables 2 and 3 show the complexity of our attack against generic MinRank
problem for GeMSS and Rainbow, two cryptosystems at the second round of
the aforementioned NIST competition. The two tables also compare this new
attack to the previous MinRank attacks, which use minors modeling in the case
of GeMSS [14] and a linear algebra search [16] in the case of Rainbow. In table 3,
the column “Best/Type” shows the complexity of the current best attack against
Rainbow, which is not a MinRank attack.
6.3 Comparison between our approach and the use of generic
Gro¨bner basis algorithms
Since our approach is an algebraic attack, it relies on solving a polynomial sys-
tem, thus it does look like a Gro¨bner basis computation. In fact, we do compute
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Table 1. Complexity of the attack against Rank Decoding for different systems.
Cryptosystem Parameters (m,n, k, r)
m(n−k−1r )
(nr)−1
a p
m(n−k−p−1r )
(n−p−ar )−1
This paper [11]
Loidreau ([29]) (128, 120, 80, 4) 1.28 0 3 1.02 64.2 98
ROLLO-I-128 (79, 94, 47, 5) 1.97 0 9 1.05 70.2 117
ROLLO-I-192 (89, 106, 53, 6) 1.06 0 0 1.06 86.2 144
ROLLO-I-256 (113, 134, 67, 7) 0.67 8 0 1.04 158.1 197
ROLLO-II-128 (83, 298, 149, 5) 2.42 0 40 1.01 93.0 134
ROLLO-II-192 (107, 302, 151, 6) 1.53 0 18 1.01 110.5 164
ROLLO-II-256 (127, 314, 157, 7) 0.89 6 0 1.01 169.8 217
ROLLO-III-128 (101, 94, 47, 5) 2.52 0 12 1.03 69.5 119
ROLLO-III-192 (107, 118, 59, 6) 1.31 0 4 1.04 88.0 148
ROLLO-III-256 (131, 134, 67, 7) 0.78 5 0 1.02 137.7 200
RQC-I (97, 134, 67, 5) 2.60 0 18 1.04 76.6 123
RQC-II (107, 202, 101, 6) 1.46 0 10 1.04 100.9 156
RQC-III (137, 262, 131, 7) 0.93 3 0 1.01 143.8 214
a Gro¨bner basis of the system, as we compute the unique solution of the system,
which represents its Gro¨bner basis.
Nevertheless, our algorithm is not a generic Gro¨bner basis algorithm as it
only works for the special type of system studied in this paper: the RSD and
MinRank systems. As it is specifically designed for this purpose and for the
reasons detailled below, it is more efficient than a generic algorithm.
There are three main reasons why our approach is more efficient than a
generic Gro¨bner basis algorithm:
• We compute formally (that is to say at no extra cost except the size of the
equations) new equations of degree r (the MaxMinors ones) that are already
in the ideal, but not in the vector space
Fr := 〈uf : u monomial of degree r − 2, f in the set of initial polynomials〉.
In fact, a careful analysis of a Gro¨bner basis computation with a normal
strategy shows that those equations are in Fr+1, and that the first degree
fall for those systems is r + 1. Here, we apply linear algebra directly on a
small number of polynomials of degree r (see the two following items for
more details), whereas a generic Gro¨bner basis algorithm would compute a
lot of polynomials of degree r+1 and then reduce them in order to get those
polynomials of degree r.
• A classical Gro¨bner basis algorithm using linear algebra and a normal strat-
egy will construct matrices like the Macaulay ones, where the rows corre-
spond to polynomials in the ideal and the columns to monomials of a certain
degree. Here, we introduce variables cT that represent maximal minors of C,
and thus represent not one monomial of degree r, but r! monomials of degree
r. As we compute the Gro¨bner basis by using only polynomials that can be
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Table 2. Complexity comparison between the new and the previous MinRank attacks
against GeMSS parameters. Recall that the previous attack used minors (see [14]). The
new complexity is computed by finding the number of columns n′ and the degree b that
minimizes the complexity, as described in Section 5.
Complexity
(D,n,∆, v) n/m K r n′ b New Previous
GeMSS128(513, 174, 12, 12) 174 162 34 61 2 158 522
GeMSS192(513, 256, 22, 20) 265 243 52 94 2 224 537
GeMSS256(513, 354, 30, 33) 354 324 73 126 3 304 1254
RedGeMSS128(17, 177, 15, 15) 177 162 35 62 2 160 538
RedGeMSS192(17, 266, 23, 25) 266 243 53 90 3 227 870
RedGeMSS256(17, 358, 34, 35) 358 324 74 120 3 305 1273
BlueGeMSS128(129, 175, 13, 14) 175 162 35 63 2 162 537
BlueGeMSS192(129, 265, 22, 23) 265 243 53 90 3 229 870
BlueGeMSS256(129, 358, 34, 32) 358 324 74 111 3 305 1273
Table 3. Comparison between the new MinRank attack, the previous best MinRank
attack using linear algebra search, and the best known attack for Rainbow. Here the
acronyms RBS and DA stand from Rainbow Band Separation and Direct Algebraic,
respectively [16]. The new complexity is computed by finding the number of columns
n′ and the degree b that minimizes the complexity, as described in Section 5.
Complexity
Rainbow(GF (q), v1, o1, o2) n K r n
′ b New Previous Best / Type
Ia(GF (16), 32, 32, 32) 96 33 64 84 2 162 161 145/RBS
IIIc(GF (256), 68, 36, 36) 140 37 104 132 1 217 585 215/DA
Vc(GF (256), 92, 48, 48) 188 49 140 176 2 281 778 275/DA
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expressed in terms of those variables (see the last item below), this reduces
the number of columns of our matrices by a factor around r! compared to
generic Macaulay-like matrices.
• The solution can be found by applying linear algebra only to some specific
equations, namely the MaxMinors ones in the overdetermined case, and in
the underdetermined case, equations that have degree 1 in the cT variables,
and degree b − 1 in the xi variables (see Section 5.3). This enables us to
deal with polynomials involving only the cT variables and the xi variables,
whereas a generic Gro¨bner basis algorithm would consider all monomials up
to degree r + b in the xl and the ci,j variables. This drastically reduces the
number of rows and columns in our matrices.
For all of those reasons, in the overdetermined case, only an elimination on
our selected MaxMinors equations (with a “compacted” matrix with respect to
the columns) is sufficient to get the solution; so we essentially avoid going up to
the degree r + 1 to produce those equations, we select a small number of rows,
and gain a factor r! on the number of columns.
In the underdetermined case, we find linear equations by linearization on
some well-chosen subspaces of the vector space Fr+b. We have theoretical reasons
to believe that our choice of subspace should lead to the computation of the
solution (as usual, this is a “genericity” hypothesis), and it is confirmed by all
our experiments.
7 Examples of new parameters for ROLLO-I and RQC
In light of the attacks presented in this article, it is possible to give a few examples
of new parameters for the rank-based cryptosystems, submitted to the NIST
competition, ROLLO and RQC. With these new parameters, ROLLO and RQC
would be resistant to our attacks, while still remaining attractive, for example
with a loss of only about 50 % in terms of key size for ROLLO-I.
For cryptographic purpose, parameters have to belong to an area which does
not correspond to the overdetermined case and such that the hybrid approach
would make the attack worse than in the underdetermined case.
Alongside the algebraic attacks in this paper, the best combinatorial attack
against RSD is in [4]; as a reminder, for attacking a [n, k] code over Fqm with
target rank r, its complexity is
O
(
(nm)2qr⌈m(k+1)n ⌉−m
)
.
Remark 3. In this section, the notation is chosen to match the one in ROLLO
and RQC submissions’ specifications ([7] and [1]). One should be careful that
here, n is the block-length and not the length of the code which can be either
2n or 3n.
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In what follows, we consider ω = 2.81 and we use the following notation, for
ROLLO (Table 4):
– over/hybrid is the cost of the hybrid attack; the value of a is the smallest
to reach the overdetermined case, a = 0 means that parameters are already
in the overdetermined case,
– under is the case of underdetermined attack.
– comb is the the cost of the best combinatorial attack mentioned above,
– DFR is the binary logarithm of the Decoding Failure Rate,
and for RQC (Table 5):
• hyb2n(a): hybrid attack for length 2n, the value of a is the smallest to reach
the overdetermined case, a = 0 means that parameters are already in the
overdetermined case,
• hyb3n(a): non-homogeneous hybrid attack for length 3n, a is the same as
above. This attack corresponds to an adaptation of our attack to a non-
homogeneous error of the RQC scheme, more details are given in [1],
• und2n: underminated attack for length 2n,
• comb3n: combinatorial attack for length 3n.
For more details about those parameters and the aforementioned attacks,
reader may refer to the submissions specifications of ROLLO (see [7]) and RQC
(see [1]).
Instance q n m r d pk size (B) DFR over/hybrid a p under b comb
new2ROLLO-I-128 2 83 73 7 8 757 -27 233 18 0 180 3 195
new2ROLLO-I-192 2 97 89 8 8 1057 -33 258* 17 0 197* 3 256*
new2ROLLO-I-256 2 113 103 9 9 1454 -33 408* 30 0 283* 6 348*
Table 4. New parameters and attacks complexities for ROLLO-I.
Instance q n m k w wr δ pk (B) hyb2n(a) hyb3n(a) und2n b comb3n
newRQC-I 2 113 127 3 7 7 6 1793 160(6) 211(0) 158 1 184
newRQC-II 2 149 151 5 8 8 8 2812 331(24) 262(0) 224 3 268
newRQC-III 2 179 181 3 9 9 7 4049 553(44) 321(5) 324 6 378
Table 5. New parameters and attacks complexities for RQC.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we improve on the results by [11] on the Rank Decoding problem
by providing a better analysis which permits to avoid the use of generic Gro¨bner
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basis algorithms and permits to completely break rank-based cryptosystems pa-
rameters proposed to the NIST Standardization Process, when analysis in [11]
only attacked slightly these parameters (mostly corresponding to the overdeter-
minated case defined in [11]).
We generalize this approach to the case of the MinRank problem for which
we obtain the best known complexity with algebraic attacks. We also proposed
a new approach for the underdeterminated case as described in [11], for some
parameters this attack supersedes the results of [11], in particular for attacking
ROLLO-I-256 parameters.
Overall the results proposed in this paper give a new and deeper under-
standing of the complexity of difficult problems based on the rank metric. These
problems have a strong interest since many systems still in the second round of
the NIST standardization process, like ROLLO, RQC, GeMSS or Rainbow can
be attacked through these problems.
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